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Workfare in the Undemocratic States: The Case of China  
 
Introduction 
 
Workfare is a key welfare approach in many Western countries. Some Chinese academics and 
mass media assert that Western-style workfare should be further implemented in China; 
portraying public assistance recipients as lazy and abusing of public benefits without 
incentive for work (Xinhua Net, 2006; People’s Daily Net, 2007). A senior official proposed 
that able-bodied claimants should only receive short-term financial assistance, with a 
requirement of doing community work (Qiu, 2005).On the other hand, it was reported that the 
levels of financial assistance for poor people are relatively low (Zhang and Tang, 2005). 
Therefore, the thesis of China’s attractive benefits leading to welfare dependency needs to be 
supported by more convincing evidence.  
 
Workfare seems to be the Chinese government’s strategy to manage welfare demands from 
both laid-off workers and other poor people. As a result of the restructuring of a large number 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), both central and local governments had limited resources 
to pay compensation for laid off workers. It was found that 24,214 SOEs failed to pay wages 
and pensions to 3.5 million workers in 1996 (Chen, 2000). Also in 1997, nearly one third of 
laid-off workers from small SOEs and about 8% from large SOEs did not receive 
unemployment assistance (Cai, 2002). Despite the mentioned welfare pressures from laid-off 
workers, the Chinese government introduced new social assistance benefits for poor people in 
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urban and rural areas in 1997 and 2007 respectively because of having to secure social 
stability (Chan 2011). Thus, coercive measures associated with workfare policy help control 
the number of social security applicants, reducing the Chinese government’s financial 
pressures. 
 
Western-style workfare has been implemented in democratic countries in which social 
security policies are monitored by public representatives and the power of welfare 
bureaucrats is checked by an independent judicial system. China, however, is an authoritarian 
polity where the general public has little power in shaping workfare policies and monitoring 
the activities of welfare officials. Therefore, this paper examines the problems caused by 
workfare in China and is comprised of three sections. Section one examines welfare 
bureaucrats and welfare appeals in some Western democratic welfare states; section two 
investigates the problems of workfare in China; and, section three, based on China’s 
experiences, discusses the implications of workfare in authoritarian states. 
 
Social Services and Welfare Bureaucrats 
 
Workfare has become a key approach in some Western welfare states and the concept of 
activation is a ‘cornerstone of social policy development’ (Lodemel and Trickey, 2000: 14). 
The key feature of workfare is mandatory participation that requires unemployed recipients to 
regularly meet welfare officers, attend education and employment programmes and, in some 
cases, complete unpaid community work. Some government leadership believe that 
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compulsory training and other measures can benefit welfare recipients by enhancing poor 
people’s employability and ultimately tackling the underlying cause of poverty. 
 
On the other hand, workfare has aroused discussions about the power of frontline welfare 
bureaucrats. Lipsky (1980) pointed out that street-level bureaucrats, who directly provide 
services for welfare users, do not have adequate resources to achieve the original policy 
objectives. Facing unmanageable demands, welfare bureaucrats in the USA used various 
strategies to cope with their duties such as limiting the information of services, increasing the 
waiting time and imposing extra restrictions on eligibility. For example, Ellis (2007: 416) 
found that British social workers in a local authority tried to avoid proposing direct payments 
arrangements to service users because of ‘deficiencies in the administrative infrastructure’ 
and the ‘lack of support for recipients’. These problems were confirmed by a study which 
found that there was no ‘unclear guidance’ and also ‘a marked lack of adequate and detailed 
information’ for service users on using direct payments (The Princess Royal Trust for Carers, 
2009: 3). Some social care professionals did not attempt to promote direct payments ‘for fear 
of raising expectations which were unlikely to be fulfilled’ as a result to limited funds (The 
Princess Royal Trust for Carers, 2009: 3). 
 
Limited resources also restricted the effectiveness of Australia’s One to One programme, 
which aimed to offer individualised support and services to unemployed recipients. 
According to Howard (2012), too many cases were assigned to welfare workers of the 
Centrelink that administrates the programme. The workers rationed interactions with service 
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users by offering them with ‘very few, very short appointments’ (Howard, 2012: 665). As a 
result, service users experience a programme that has the appearance of functioning but 
ultimately lacks depth of social support and opportunity for real change. It was reported that 
some welfare workers even portrayed negative images of welfare claimants in order to 
rationalise their social control role. After interviewing 100 welfare-to-work program 
managers in North Carolina in the United States of America, Seale and her colleagues (Seale 
et al, 2012: 509) reported that some felt their clients lacked motivation; some believed they 
were responsible for ‘program failures’ because of being ‘unmotivated’, ‘childlike’ and 
‘incompetent’. By portraying the negative images of social security recipients, the 
programme managers could justify their disciplining and policing role (Seale et al, 2012).  
 
The illustrated evidence shows that welfare officers have developed strategies to manage 
workloads and justify their control over clients’ behaviour. Therefore, the rights of poor 
people can be suppressed by street-level bureaucrats’ coping strategies in addition to a 
government’s complicated benefit rules. This is further complicated by the fact that 
impoverished services users tend to be less educated and know little about official policies – 
often they are left feeling both confused and intimidated by the benefits claims process.  
 
Welfare Appeals in Democratic Countries 
 
Western democratic countries use welfare appeals and complaints mechanisms to check the 
power of welfare bureaucrats. As noted by Reich (1965: 1256-57), ‘In a society that is highly 
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organized, institutional and bureaucratic, law is the essential means by which individuals are 
protected; law alone can ensure the fairness and lack of oppression that is essential to 
individual independence’. In the UK, if welfare recipients are not satisfied with a Jobcentre 
Plus’ explanations on terminating their benefits, as per legal rights service users can make 
appeals to the Social Security and Child Support Tribunal (Directgov, 2012), which is the 
first-tier tribunal. Organisations such as the Citizens Advice Bureau, local welfare rights 
groups, trade unions and law centres not only offer free or low-cost advice to appellants; they 
can also accompany them to oral hearings. If the outcome is unsatisfactory, there are 
mechanisms for further appeals to an Upper Tribunal. 
 
Similarly, welfare recipients in Australia can lodge complaints to the Social Security Appeals 
Tribunal, which is an independent statutory agency providing ‘a mechanism of review that is 
fair, just, economical, informal and quick’ (Centrelink, 2012: n.p.). The recipients can make 
further appeals to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the Court system. In the US, 
welfare recipients can bring their cases to a federal district court or a state court. Alternatively, 
more frequently they choose an administrative fair hearing conducted by a state hearing 
examiner (Geetter, 1988).  
 
It should be stressed that Western democratic welfare states are not homogeneous but have 
some degree of variation. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), Western welfare states can 
be divided into three types of regimes, including a liberal regime, a conservative regime and a 
social democratic regime. The level of public assistance and its application requirements as 
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well as the welfare role of an individual, the family and state vary among Western welfare 
states. Also, like undemocratic countries, the welfare appeal systems in Western democratic 
states have deficiencies. For example, the welfare appeal system in Ireland was criticised by 
the Free Advice Centres (2012) as lacking transparency and consistency as well as causing 
lengthy delays in decisions.  
 
In the USA, legal barriers and the biases of administrative law judges have suppressed the 
rights of welfare appellants (Geetter, 1988; Lens, 2007). For example, its fair hearing 
mechanism has disadvantaged poor people because they are unable to recover fees even after 
winning their claims (Geetter, 1988). Lens’s (2007: 329) study found that at some fair 
hearings welfare recipients ‘do not have the power to command the proof they need. They are 
often outmatched by their opponents’. Such hearings were transformed into interrogations of 
the appellants. The credibility of administrative law judges is also under scrutiny. After 
analysing the results of some research studies, Golin (1995: 1544) concluded that there was 
‘convincing evidence of gender and racial bias’ in some benefits hearings conducted by 
administrative law judges. Vendel (2005: 770) also reported similar findings, stressing that 
‘bias inevitably seeps into’ the decisions of administrative law judges from ‘racial, gender, 
class prejudice, to bias against disability claimants in general’. According the Sargent Shriver 
National Center on Poverty Law (2014: n.p.), the benefits of many disability claimants in 
Queens, New York, were denied by administrative law judges ‘in a pattern of repeated, 
glaring, and often intentional legal errors’. 
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Despite the mentioned weaknesses, the importance and achievements of welfare appeals 
mechanisms in Western democratic states should not be underestimated. Fair hearings, for 
example, are ‘central to welfare rights strategies’ in the US because they help change social 
policy from below (Kornbluh, 1998: n.p.). Lens (2011) reported that fair hearings offered 
opportunities to welfare claimants to address their social and materials injuries, recast their 
relationship with government officials, and restore their self-respect and dignity. Lens (2011: 
437) concluded that the hearings provided ‘a breeding ground for germinating grievances 
among those citizens who have chosen voice over exit within the welfare system’. In the UK, 
welfare appeals have effectively safeguarded the rights of poor citizens by overturning a 
significant number of official decisions. Among 276,400 hearing clearances at the Social 
Security and Child Support Tribunal in 2009-10, 35% of decisions were in favour of the 
appellants (Ministry of Justice, 2011).  
 
In summary, the power of welfare bureaucrats has been enhanced by workfare as they can 
shape unemployed recipients’ job-seeking behaviour, reducing and even terminating their 
benefits. Also, welfare bureaucrats always use various strategies to manage workloads; 
limiting welfare recipients' access to social services and other obstructionist tactics is a 
known problem. In Reich’s (1965: 1246) words, welfare provision is surrounded by the 
processes of administrative procedure that ‘has developed its own abuses and oppressiveness’. 
To balance the power between government officials and social security recipients, some 
Western democratic countries have established welfare appeals systems. Fair hearings in the 
U.S have embodied ‘foundational notions of due process and the rights of citizens to 
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challenge arbitrary government power’ (Lens, 2011: 434). On the other hand, China is an 
authoritarian polity; this raises questions as to whether China has the necessary arrangements 
to safeguard the rights of poor citizens when it has been urged to adopt more Western-style 
workfare measures.  
 
Workfare and China’s Social Security Administration 
 
In China, workfare is a decentralised and loose social policy (Chan, 2011). It is hard to gather 
all workfare programmes in different parts of China since each region has set up their own 
unique schemes. This development was mainly caused by central government’s simple 
guideline by only starting that beneficiaries of the Minimum Living Standard Scheme (MLSS) 
with a work capacity have to join community work organized by residents’ committees (ROs) 
(State Council, 1999). As a consequence, numerous workfare programmes have been 
launched as China has more than 160 cities with more than 2 million residents (The 
Telegraph, 2013). It should be noted that the details of some local workfare programmes 
cannot be easily accessed as the published information varies from local government to local 
government. Against this background, this paper will focus on workfare in Guangzhou 
because it was the first Chinese city that introduced a comprehensive workfare scheme in 
2005. In addition, more empirical research studies were conducted in Guangzhou which can 
provide essential data for assessing the impact of workfare. Apart from Guangzhou, this 
paper also will examine some common national policies that affect both Guangzhou and 
other regions such as the role of street offices (SOs), residents’ committees (RCs), and 
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villagers’ committees (VCs) in implementing workfare as well as the effectiveness of the 
existing welfare appeals mechanism.  
 
In Guangzhou, workfare mainly targets the recipients of MLSS. There are two types of 
minimum living standard schemes: one is for urban citizens, called the Urban Minimum 
Living Standard Scheme and another is for farmers, called the Rural Minimal Living 
Standard Scheme. The urban scheme was set up in 1997 (State Council, 1997) and its details 
were spelt out in The Urban Residents’ Minimal Living Standard Scheme Ordinance (State 
Council, 1999). The ordinance defines basic necessities as clothing, food and housing; it also 
urges local authorities to take expenses such as water, electricity, gas, and education for 
children and young people into account while developing their local schemes. From 2000 to 
2009, the number of the Urban Minimum Living Standard Scheme recipients increased six 
fold, from 4 million to 23.5 million, and the average benefit level increased from ¥149 in 
2003 to ¥228 in 2009 (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010).The Rural Minimal Living Standard 
Scheme was established nationally following the publication of The Notification on the 
Establishment of a Nationwide Minimal Living Standard Scheme in Rural Area in July 2007. 
Poor families can apply for public assistance if their household income is below the threshold 
of the regional MLSS (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2008). From 2001 to 2009, the number of 
Urban Minimum Living Standard Scheme claimants dramatically increased by more than 10 
times, from 3 million to 47.6 million (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010). A family is eligible for 
the MLSS if the average income of its family members is below a region’s poverty threshold. 
In Guangzhou, this is a monthly income of ¥530 for urban residents and ¥467 for rural 
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residents in 2013(Southern Metropolis Daily, 2013).  
 
The Guangzhou government published its workfare policy in The Regulations for MLSS 
Recipients in Guangzhou City to Participate in Community Work in 2005(Guangzhou 
Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau, 2005). The document listed out the following key elements:   
 
(a) Target claimants: Unemployed women from 18 to 50 years old and unemployed men 
between18 and 60 are required to do community work three-and-a-half days weekly 
with a total of 11 hours and 30 minutes per week (Golden Goat Net, 2005). 
(b) Type of community work: A wide range of community work is offered to claimant, 
including community sanitation, neighbourhood patrols, providing support for older 
people, and arranging and distributing donated goods. 
(c) Sanctions: If welfare claimants fail to do community work twice a month (Golden 
Goat Net, 2005) or their able-bodied members refuse to accept job offers twice, their 
benefits will be ceased (Shishu Street Office, 2008). 
 
According to the Guangzhou municipal government, the workfare policy aimed to enhance a 
sense of reciprocity among public assistance recipients (Golden Goat Net, 2005).   
 
In Guangzhou, SOs and RCs are appointed to administrate the community work programme 
(Guangzhou Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau, 2005; Xian Street Office, 2013). The following 
section will analyse problems associated with workfare in China based on the experiences of 
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Guangzhou, supported by evidence in other regions. 
 
Voluntary organisations and the MLSS 
 
In China, volunteers from community organisations act as frontline social security officers to 
handle MLSS applications. Local authorities asked residents’ committees and villagers’ 
committees to take up key welfare duties, including offering advice to applicants, assisting 
them in completing forms, checking eligibility, giving recommendations to higher 
administrative bodies for benefit approvals and carrying out home visits. Although the 
Chinese government claims that RCs are self-governing neighbourhood organisations 
(Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2008), lower level government agencies often treat them as 
subordinate administrative units, asking them to fulfil many official duties (Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, 2008). It was reported that RCs had to deal with 48 main tasks and 168 minor tasks. 
As a consequence, their officers did not have sufficient time to attend meetings and tackle 
community problems (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2008). In short, the RCs are actually local 
governments’ foot soldiers for launching social, economic and political activities.  
 
In rural areas, VCs are taking on a role similar to RCs in cities. In 2007, there were 613,000 
VCs through which poor families could submit their MLSS applications (Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, 2008). The VCs will firstly assess the financial conditions of the public assistance 
applicants and then send their recommendations to the township government. After 
rechecking the applicants’ details, officials from the township government will pass their 
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comments to the county government for final approval. The VCs also conduct regular income 
checks and even home visits on the existing claimants (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2008). 
 
Obviously, both RCs and VCs are performing social security duties that should be undertaken 
by civil servants in Western democratic countries. Ngok’s1 (2012) study in Guangzhou 
reported that the duties of RCs include checking the MLSS applications, holding meetings to 
discuss eligibility, paying benefits to successful applicants, arranging community work for 
recipients, checking the financial conditions of the existing recipients and managing the 
MLSS records. By using non-government organisations to implement public assistance, the 
Chinese government can quickly mobilise 300,000-500,000 volunteers to handle MLSS 
applications in urban areas (Tang, 2005). In this way, local authorities do not need to set up 
new social security offices, nor recruit additional welfare staff to deal with welfare expansion 
following China’s economic reform. 
 
However, there are two problems associated with this arrangement. Firstly, the added duties 
have overburdened the community organisations; there is a serious doubt about their 
capacities to provide an acceptable quality of service to claimants (Tang, 2005). Secondly, it 
is questionable whether the volunteers have the required knowledge and skills to enforce 
coercive measures without threatening recipients’ welfare rights. According to the central 
government, among those who ran the services of RCs, 70% were older people and 80% only 
had primary and secondary education (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2008). Other studies also 
reported that the volunteers lacked professional qualifications and the quality of their services 
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was inconsistent (Tang, 2002; Qingdao Public Administration Institute Research Team, 2003; 
Wu and Shi, 2005). As mentioned earlier, the Guangzhou municipal government asked the 
workers of RCs to implement workfare activities. However, some of them were found to be 
unable to communicate effectively with clients. In response to complaints about the poor 
communication skills of RC’s workers, a government official admitted, ‘Because the workers 
of RCs are from different social backgrounds and also have to bear a lot of duties, it is 
common to see some of them have poor work attitudes’ (Ngok, 2012).Because of frontline 
workers’ poor training, some unemployed workers cannot get essential benefit information, 
nor can their psychological and employment needs be accurately assessed. For example, 
without having received additional support, a single mother in Guangzhou was asked to take 
up a job preventing her from taking care of her daughter and mother-in-law. She pointed out, 
‘Yes, I said I have reasons for not taking up their offer but they just refused to listen and only 
said that my benefit will be terminated if I don’t accept the job’ (Ngok et al, 2011). Obviously, 
welfare workers ‘failed to consider job offers on a case-by-case basis by taking the 
beneficiaries’ individual abilities into consideration’ (Ngok et al, 2011). 
 
The problems of official social security administration 
 
In China, SOs are the lowest official administrative units, launching social security and other 
public services such as health, housing, education, birth control and crime prevention. In 
Guangzhou, poor people can submit their MLSS applications to either SOs or RCs and then 
their staff will check the information and carry out home visits. The SOs will also put the 
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names of applicants on the public notice boards in order to get comments from applicants’ 
neighbours. Before sending to the district government, a SO will comprehensively assess 
applicants’ family conditions with the help of the members of RCs and workers from the 
community assistance point (Huanghuagang Street Community Service Centre, 2013).Some 
SOs in Guangzhou have set up Comprehensive Assistance Centres to handle various types of 
social security benefits. For example, the Yuexiu district government established 
Comprehensive Assistance Centres in its 22 SOs and their workers will assess all MLSS 
applications (Xin Hua Net, 2007). 
 
Lacking professional training among frontline welfare bureaucrats is one of the weaknesses 
of China’s social security system. Although the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2008: 68) admitted 
that workers dealing with the MLSS applications require ‘professional values, knowledge and 
skills’, most welfare officers do not possess social work, counselling, or career guidance 
qualifications. Lipsky (1980) stated that street-level bureaucrats do not disclose information 
in order to minimise workloads. An example of this is unemployed claimants in Guangzhou 
were reportedly given little information about working hours for community work and 
financial incentives for keeping their jobs (Ngok, 2012). 
 
As mentioned previously, SOs and RCs in Guangzhou are responsible for arranging 
community work. They can define the contents and requirements of community work and 
also monitor the MLSS recipients’ attendance (Guangzhou Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau, 
2005). However, the community work programmes are mainly social and community services 
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for older and disabled people (Guangzhou Municipal Civil Affairs Bureau, 2005), which are 
not tailor-made programmes for addressing welfare recipients’ employment barriers. Also, it 
was reported that the participants were asked to do voluntary work regardless of their health 
conditions. For example, a claimant in Guangzhou was forced to do community work despite 
ill health (Ngok, 2012). Another study reported that an acute cancer patient was asked to 
continue doing a patrol duty in the evenings because the authority could not find someone to 
swap with him. As the respondent stated, ‘I am scared of negotiating with the RC’s workers 
because of worrying about benefit cuts’ (Wong and Li, 2013). Obviously, by enforcing 
coercive welfare measures, volunteers and untrained welfare workers have put the physical 
health of some welfare recipients at risk. 
 
Similar problems were reported in other regions. For example, a recipient was frustrated with 
having been asked to repair public roads, which was actually a village authority’s routine 
duty (People’s Daily Net, 2012). One local government required old age recipients to perform 
community work, and their adult children were even allowed to do it on their behalf. Another 
local government allowed the MLSS recipients to pay someone to do community work 
(Yunnan Net, 2012). These practices clearly showed that community work in some regions is 
a punishment on poor people with the main purposes of maintaining work ethics, family 
dependency and enhancing the stigmatisation of public assistance. The illustrated examples 
also indicate that there are no proper guidelines on the contents and objectives of community 
work.  As a result, some government officials have abused their power, forcing welfare 
claimants to perform tasks without considering their physical limitations and employment 
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needs.   
 
Many welfare bureaucrats, similar to the program managers in the US discussed earlier (Seale 
et al, 2012), also hold a negative attitude towards welfare beneficiaries. Some regarded them 
as ‘lazy and hopeless people’ (Wu and Shi, 2005). A RC worker in Guangzhou emphasised 
that increasing benefits for MLSS claimants would create welfare dependency and place 
additional financial burden on the government (Wong and Li2, 2013).  
 
More importantly, many SOs are underfunded and welfare workers are unable to manage a 
large number of MLSS cases. According to Xunyang Civil Affairs Bureau (2008), welfare 
staff at its public assistance centres had to manage different types of social services without 
sufficient human resources and communication and transport facilities.  Another local 
government explained that there were three major problems constraining its social security 
services, including a weak service delivery network, insufficient number of public assistance 
units and inadequate budgets to cover administrative costs (Organisation Department of 
Shanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party, 2012). Clearly, local welfare officials 
are struggling to fulfil basic social security duties; the implementation of workfare 
programmes in some regions is actually beyond their capacities. In particular, public 
assistance in China is mainly financed by contributions from different levels of local 
governments and some of them have inadequate resources. It was reported that the amount of 
debt for all village authorities in China in 2004 was between ¥600 billion and ¥1,000 billion 
(Zhu et al, 2006). 
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Some may argue that the Guangzhou municipal government has already used professional 
social workers to deliver services. There were more than 550 social workers who provided 
services at 54 comprehensive family services centres in 2012 (China Social Workers 
Association, 2012).We should recognise the efforts of the Guangzhou government in offering 
more professional social services to disadvantaged groups. In particular, it aimed to establish 
a comprehensive family services centre in every administrative area of a SO (Chen, 2013). 
However, the contributions of social workers to social security provision in China should not 
be over-exaggerated at this stage. Firstly, there is no administrative guideline or legislation 
that requires social workers to administrate public assistance. The existing official documents 
only assign SOs and RCs to manage MLSS applications. Therefore, the involvement of social 
workers in administrating public assistance is limited and selective. Some SOs and RCs may 
ask social workers to visit MLSS families and give them welfare advice (China Net, 2011; 
People Street Family Services Centre, 2012; Dongguan City Tongde Social Work Service 
Centre, 2013). However, they do not have a statutory duty to deliver core public assistance 
services.  
 
In summary, key social security workers in China are mainly volunteers or untrained 
bureaucrats. Most of them do not receive sufficient training to accurately assess the needs of 
unemployed claimants, nor do they have the required knowledge to design effective 
programmes to tackle welfare recipients’ employment barriers. They are also overburdened, 
lacking sufficient resources to deliver basic services. The deficiencies of China’s social 
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security administration have allowed some volunteers and welfare officers to abuse power by 
forcing unemployed recipients to do community work regardless of their caring duties and 
health conditions. 
 
Welfare sanctions and appeals 
 
In China, welfare workers from RCs and SOs can easily terminate or reduce the benefits of 
the MLSS recipients without going through a stringent procedure. For example, a disabled 
MLSS applicant in Guangzhou was disappointed with a staff member of an RC who had 
refused to give him a full unemployment payment. The staff member claimed that the 
disabled claimant’s wife had work ability so that only ‘low income’ benefit could be granted. 
Moreover, the applicant was asked to state in the application form that his wife’s monthly 
salary was ¥500, even though she actually did not work (Ngok, 2012). Another applicant said 
that a RC deducted her benefit by ¥50 because her neighbours informed them that she 
received unreported income by selling goods on the street (Ngok, 2012). Obviously, workers 
of the RC in Guangzhou have a great deal of power to decide the amount of payment and 
terminate benefits without having any rigorous procedure. Some towns and villages in China 
can terminate the benefits of MLSS recipients according to the decisions of a committee 
composed of representatives of a village. For example, Xikou Town ceased the benefits of 
100 families following the meetings of its village evaluation committee (Chengdu 
Commercial Post Net, 2011). 
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Some local governments will occasionally ask several departments to take a joint action 
against welfare fraud. For example, several government departments in Henan province 
jointly checked public assistance applications approved by lower-level administrative units. 
As a result of this exercise, the local authority terminated the benefits of more than 435,000 
recipients in five counties (Beijing Morning Post, 2011). The issue of concern is whether 
frontline bureaucrats who implement large scale anti-fraud campaigns have seriously taken 
the circumstances of welfare recipients into account. It was reported that some recipients’ 
benefits were terminated without receiving prior notice. The affected recipients were unable 
to get a clear explanation from the authorities on the reasons for terminating their benefits 
(Beijing Morning Post, 2011; Chinese Commercial Post, 2012; People’s Daily Net, 2012). 
 
More importantly, many local authorities have restricted the welfare rights of poor people by 
adding extra benefit criteria. In Guangzhou, the benefit of a MLSS recipient was ceased 
because he owned a rice cooker (Ngok, 2012). A welfare worker in another study said: ‘we 
will not approve MLSS applications for those who have a big house and many electrical 
appliances and a car’ (Wong and Li, 2013). A similar policy has been adopted by other local 
authorities. For example, according to the Instruction of the Minimum Standard of Living 
Scheme in Shandong province, recipients’ benefits will be terminated if they are found 
having meals at luxurious restaurants, possessing items such as mobile phones, digital 
cameras or a refrigerator. Their benefits also will be terminated if they have some 
unacceptable behaviour such as taking illicit drugs, paying for sex and violating national birth 
control policy (Wu and Shi, 2005).  
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Although China’s laws allow welfare claimants to use administrative appeals to take  
abusive welfare officials to court, it is difficult to exercise this right in reality. The Urban 
Residents’ Minimum Living Standard Scheme Ordinance in 1999 states that if an 
unemployed claimant does not agree with a welfare worker’s decision on benefit cuts, he/she 
can ask the Civil Affairs Bureau to re-examine his case through an ‘administrative review’. If 
he/she is not satisfied with the outcome of the administrative review, he/she can take the 
concerned government department to the court through ‘administrative litigation’. A further 
appeal can also be lodged if he/she is not satisfied with the court’s sentence. 
 
In fact, it is almost impossible for poor people in China to defend their welfare rights. Zhang 
(2009) drew our attention to several problems with the existing administrative review system. 
Firstly, China’s law does not require all administrative review officers to have the same 
qualifications. This means that the officers might not have adequate knowledge to perform a 
high standard of review. Secondly, the status of administrative review officers is relatively 
low; they are not entitled to specific job-related benefits enjoyed by other civil servants. 
However, they have to take a heavy workload. Thus, it is difficult to attract high quality 
university graduates to do the job. Thirdly, many local authorities do not provide sufficient 
financial support for their administrative review units. As a result, the officers are overloaded 
and do not have sufficient time and essential assistance to review all cases.  
 
In addition, many government departments adopt a non-cooperative attitude by delaying or 
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even rejecting review officers’ requests for essential documents (Xie, 2010). Some even 
reject the results of the administrative reviews. In short, the administrative review units are 
too weak to enforce their decisions.  
 
Welfare claimants in China also can hardly lodge complaints through administrative 
litigations. In the first place, not all appeals will be accepted by the courts. In particular, 
sensitive cases can be rejected on the basis of political reasons (O’Brien and Li, 2004). More 
importantly, a Chinese court can seldom carry out a fair trial because the appointment of 
judges and the allocation of the court’s budget are controlled by senior officials of the local 
governments (O’Brien and Li, 2004).  
 
The status of judges in China is relatively low and the power of the court is very weak. Very 
often, the decisions of a court are influenced by senior local officials and the Chinese 
Communist Party’s cadets, as well as representatives of the People’s Congress (Ma, 2011). In 
Liu’s words (2006: 94), ‘local political legitimacy substantially shapes the operation of legal 
procedures in the judicial process’. Zhang (2003) even claimed that a judge in China is ‘little 
more than a bureaucratic clerk’, as sentences of a court are mainly decided by senior officials 
within ‘the power pyramid’ (cited in Liu, 2006: 94). It is obvious that China’s judiciary is not 
independent of central and local administration and welfare appellants can hardly use it to 
defend their rights.   
 
Expensive legal costs are another obstacle preventing welfare claimants from seeking justice. 
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After investigating the administrative litigations in rural China, O’Brien and Li (2004: 78) 
pointed out: ‘Litigating is expensive; getting a case accepted is difficult and long delays are 
common’. Villagers also claimed that ‘it is futile or even dangerous to contest unfair 
administrative decisions or unjust sanctions’ (Hung, cited in O’Brien and Li, 2004: 76). Also, 
welfare appellants are difficult to receive legal aid that is administrated on a regional basis. 
The application criteria of legal aid are decided by local authorities based on their financial 
conditions (Zhang, 2011). This arrangement has led to variations among local authorities, 
creating legal aid inequality in China. To qualify for legal aid assistance, welfare recipients 
must give income evidence. This means that unemployed recipients from rural areas have to 
ask a VC which imposed welfare sanctions on them to issue income certificates. However, 
their VCs may refuse to give them the certificates to challenge their own administrative 
decisions. Xiamen Zhang (2011), a lawyer from a regional law centre, reported that a VC did 
not issue an income certificate to a legal aid applicant and this type of malpractice has never 
been challenged in her region.  
 
Liu and Chen (2008), senior government legal officials in Sichuan province, pointed out 
other problems of the existing legal aid system. Firstly, many local governments’ legal aid 
budgets are small; each year there is less than a quarter of 700,000 eligible applications can 
receive legal aid. Secondly, some local authorities put additional criteria so that many poor 
people have been excluded from receiving legal support. Thirdly, some law firms are 
unwilling to take up legal aid cases because some local authorities refuse to pay them travel 
and accommodation expenses. Fourthly, there is inequality in legal aid services between rural 
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and urban areas. Many county governments have not allocated sufficient resources, excluding 
poor rural residents from accessing legal assistance. In short, there is no effective 
administrative and legal advocacy mechanism in China for checking the behaviour and 
ultimately accountability of welfare bureaucrats.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper uses Guangzhou and some examples in other regions to illustrate the impact of 
workfare in China. It was found that the rights of the MLSS recipients have been suppressed 
by volunteers of the RCs and workers of the SOs as most of them do not possess relevant 
welfare qualifications. As illustrated previously, unemployed recipients in Guangzhou did not 
receive adequate workfare information and were forced to take jobs regardless of their caring 
duties and health conditions. The deficiencies of volunteers in providing public services were 
also reported in Western welfare states. For example, volunteers were accused of having high 
levels of absenteeism and turnover, being unreliable, and having poor commitment to work 
(Brudney, 1993). After interviewing 21 senior managers of public libraries, Nesbit and her 
colleagues (2012:11) reported that volunteers were difficult to be recruited in some 
disadvantaged communities and some tasks could not be easily transferred to volunteers 
because ‘potential confidentiality issues, safety concerns, or interactions with vulnerable 
populations’. 
 
Given the limitations of volunteers to provide public services, more and more countries are 
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using professional welfare workers to manage social security. It was found that social 
workers in some developed countries play a dual role in providing benefits and offering 
counselling services to social security recipients (Eardley et al, 1996). According to the 
International Federation of Social Workers (2004), social workers are expected to serve their 
service users in accordance with social work values such as compassion, empathy, caring, and 
challenging unjust policies and practices. 
 
It should be stressed that welfare workers are faced with ‘increasing pressures to both enforce 
eligibility and compliance standards’ following the implementation of workfare (Handler, 
2005). In Australia, workfare regulations and the rationalities of new public management 
have constrained social workers’ autonomy. Despite these challenges, social workers 
equipped with professional ethics still found some space ‘to-frame the participation agenda so 
that it seems congruent with the formal, theoretical and substantive rationalities of social 
work’ (McDonald & Chenoweth, 2009: 157). Based on the experiences of the USA, Handler 
(2005) proposed that ‘workfare offices must be separated from the benefit offices’. This 
implies that social workers should use their skills to support unemployed workers instead of 
monitoring their behaviour and imposing sanctions. In short, welfare workers equipped with 
professional ethics tend to defend the welfare rights of poor citizens in the process of 
implementing workfare. The use of professional social workers instead of volunteers is the 
direction China’s public assistance policy should obviously go. 
 
As discussed in the earlier part of this paper, welfare claimants in Western democratic 
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societies can lodge complaints through administrative reviews and also defend their rights 
through an independent judiciary. On the other hand, China is an authoritarian polity in which 
most power is in the hands of government officials. The judiciary actually relies heavily on 
local government officials for paying the salaries of judges, clerical staff and the expenses of 
office facilities. More importantly, the appointments of judges are made by senior 
government officials. As a result, the court’s decisions have been deeply influenced by 
higher-ranking administrative units and various political actors instead of a judge’s own 
judgement. Thus, China’s legal system can hardly effectively defend the rights of 
disadvantaged groups, nor stop the abuses of the welfare officers. 
 
The case of China has shown that the nature of Western workfare is actually a product of 
democratic countries in which the administrative review mechanism and the judicial system 
can more effectively check the behaviour and decisions of welfare officials. Therefore, 
coercive measures associated with workfare are more acceptable to the general public, who 
believe that welfare sanctions can be an effective means to tackle welfare dependency. In 
undemocratic welfare states, however, welfare officers’ power will not be contested by a 
bureaucrat-controlled judiciary that serves mainly the interests of government officials. Under 
this political system, workfare measures have directly extended the power of social security 
officers to control poor people and workfare becomes an oppressive and abusive means to 
push more unemployed recipients to the labour market, regardless of their circumstances, or 
forces them to seek support from family or accept any available job. The consequences of 
workfare in an undemocratic polity like China likely excludes unemployed recipients from 
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state benefits, helping preserve its minimal public assistance scheme. 
 
Note: 
1. Ngok’s data was collected from a longitude study between April 2009 and April 2011. 
Respondents of the study included 46 recipients of the MLSS and 4 low income 
households from 11Residents’Committees under the jurisdiction of one Street Office in 
Guangzhou. Each respondent was interviewed every six months and a total of five 
interviews were conducted during the study period. 
2. Wong and Li’s study was conducted in two districts of Guangzhou from March to May 
2011. Respondents of the study included five government officials, 17 frontline workers 
and 24 MLSS claimants. 
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